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Abstract
The Ramsey tax problem examines the design of linear commodity taxes to collect a
given tax revenue. This approach has been seriously challenged by Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) who show that (under some conditions) an optimal income tax makes commodity
taxes redundant. Accordingly, the Ramsey approach to taxation is considered as dated.
In the meantime, the Ramsey setting has had a second life as model of regulatory
pricing. Boiteux (1956) studies linear pricing of a regulated multi-product monopoly
that has to cover some xed costthrough markups on the di¤erent products (equiv-
alent to taxes). While the scope of regulation has declined, Ramsey-Boiteux pricing
continues to play an important role.
This paper examines if the optimal tax and regulatory pricing approaches to Ramsey
pricing can be reconciled. We incorporate the two objectives of revenue raising for
nancing the governments expenditures and a regulated rms xed cost into a single
framework.
The rst major lesson of our study is that the existence of a break-even constraint
not only requires taxation of goods produced by the public/regulated rm but also the
taxation of other goods. Next, we consider two special cases for which the Ramsey
model yields simple and well-known results; namely, the cases of independent Hicksian
and Marshallian demand curves. In both the Ramsey solution implies the so-called
inverse elasticity rule.
In the separable Hicksian demand case, the private goods (not included in the break-
even constraint) continue to go untaxed as in the Atkinson and Stiglitz setting. In the
case where Marshallian demands are independent, the e¤ect of the break-even constraint
spills over to the other goods who no longer go untaxed. We continue to get inverse
elasticity rules; however, their structure di¤ers from the traditional expressions. In
particular, there is no covariance (or similar) term that captures redistributive consid-
erations. Instead, they contain tax revenue termsthat measure the social value of the
extra tax revenues generated from demand variations that follow the (compensating)
adjustments in disposable income.
Finally, we study the most celebrated general result obtained in the Ramsey model;
namely, the (un)equal proportional reduction in compensated demands property. We
nd that the redistributive considerations are once again replaced by tax revenue terms.
1 Introduction
The Ramsey tax problem is one of the cornerstones of optimal tax theory. The ques-
tion it examines is that of designing linear (proportional) commodity taxes to collect a
given tax revenue. Labor income is not taxed at all or subject to a linear tax.1 The
rst analysis of this problem is due to Ramsey (1927) but most of the formal results
were derived in the 1970s starting with the seminal paper by Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971). This was followed by literally hundreds of papers. Baumol and Bradford (1970)
and Sandmo (1976) provide an interesting history of this subject. The main point that
this literature makes is that, except in very special cases, commodity taxes should not
be uniform and that they should be set to balance e¢ ciency and equity considerations.
The e¢ ciency aspects appear most obviously in the inverse elasticity rules derived when
demand functions are separable (Hicksian or Marshallian). These e¢ ciency driven tax
rules which are regressive because goods with low price elasticities are often necessi-
ties consumed proportionately more by poorer households. This redistributive bias is
mitigated by the equity terms in the tax rules (often covariance terms). These tend
to increase the tax rate on goods that are consumed proportionately more by richer
individuals.
This approach to tax design has been seriously challenged by Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) who show that under some conditions an optimal income tax is su¢ cient to imple-
ment any incentive compatible Pareto-e¢ cient allocation. In other words, commodity
taxes are not needed (or should be uniform), and the Ramsey results are merely an
artifact of the restriction that income taxes must be linear (an ad hoc and inconsistent
assumption given the assumed information structure). The Atkinson and Stiglitz (AS)
result has far reaching implications for the design of optimal tax systems. In particular,
1 In the original Ramsey problem, individuals are alike and there is no income tax. With heteroge-
neous individuals, one also allows for a uniform lump-sum tax or rebate (and possibly a linear tax on
labor income).
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whenever it applies, it implies that in-kind transfers are not useful and prices should
not be used for redistribution (even in a second best setting).
It is by now well understood though that the AS result also has its own limita-
tions. In particular, it may not hold under uncertainty (Cremer and Gahvari, 1995) or
under multi-dimensional heterogeneity (Cremer, Gahvari and Ladoux, 1998, and Cre-
mer, Pestieau and Rochet, 2001) and redistribution through prices may then once again
be second-best optimal (Cremer and Gahvari, 1998 and 2002). Still, these limitations
notwithstanding, it is fair to say that the Ramsey approach to taxation is considered as
dated and no longer state of the art. It does continue to occupy a prominent place
in all advanced textbooks, but it is taught mainly as an introduction to tax design and
not because of its practical relevance.
In the meantime, the Ramsey setting has had a more or less independent second
or some might argue rst life as model of regulatory pricing. In his pioneering paper,
Boiteux (1956) studies linear pricing of a regulated multi-product monopoly that has
to cover some xed cost (for instance the infrastructure cost of the network). This
is to be achieved through markups on the monopolys di¤erent products (equivalent to
taxes).2 Formally, this problem is equivalent to a Ramsey tax model with the xed
cost playing the role of the governments tax revenue requirement. While the scope of
regulation has declined over the last decades, Ramsey-Boiteux (RB) pricing continues
to play an important role in the sectors still subject to some form of regulation. A
prominent example is the postal sector in the US where Ramsey-Boiteux pricing remains
an important benchmark in regulatory hearings; see Crew and Kleindorfer (2012). As
a matter of fact, not only has RB pricing kept its position but it has even found new
applications in setting of regulatory reform and market liberalization. For instance,
while the original Boiteux model concerns a monopoly, Ware and Winter (1985) show
that generalized RB rules prevail in imperfectly competitive markets. Furthermore,
2We follow the terminology used in the regulation literature but, in reality, this is a quasi-xed cost
relevant also in the long-run (a non convexity in the production set).
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La¤ont and Tirole (1990) argue that the network access an incumbent operator has to
provide to its upstream competitors should be priced on the basis of RB logic. Another
interesting result, shown by Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979), is that Ramsey prices
can be decentralized through an iterative procedure based on a global price cap; see
also La¤ont and Tirole (2000, page 67). Finally, the idea that prices ought to be
used for redistributive purposes is the rational for a great deal of regulatory policies
including social tari¤s and more generally universal service requirements; see Cremer
et al. (2001) for a discussion of the theoretical foundations of these policies and their
practical implementation.3
To sum up, optimal tax and regulatory pricing literatures appear to have diverged
in the way they view the implications of the AS result. This paper examines if the
two approaches can be reconciled. To this end, we incorporate the two objectives of
revenue raising for nancing the governments expenditures and a regulated rms xed
cost into a single framework. While the two decisions are formally equivalent when
each is addressed separately, a comprehensive analysis requires a unied framework.
Our setting is that of AS. More precisely, we consider a mixed taxation setting à la
Christiansen (1984) that combines nonlinear income taxation with linear pricing (taxa-
tion) of consumption goods. We assume that a subset of the goods are produced by a
public or regulated rm that has to cover a xed cost through markups on the di¤erent
commodities it sells.4 This constraint gives rise to a break-even constraint on the
part of the rm. This comes on top of the overall governments budget constraint. The
question is if this break-even constraint revives any of the Ramsey pricing or taxation
features (for goods produced by the public/regulated rm as well as for other goods).
3While it is true that regulators and especially competition authorities are often reluctant to accept
Ramsey pricing arguments, this is not because of the AS result. Their objection is more of legal and
procedural nature. In particular, Ramsey prices are often viewed as discriminatory and subject to
informational problems when the operator is better informed about demand condition than the regulator.
4Whether this rm is public, as in Boiteuxs world, or private but regulated does not matter. Either
way, one implicitly assumes that the rmsrevenues must also cover some fairrate of return on capital.
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We start by formulating the general problem a government faces when determining
incentive compatible Pareto-e¢ cient allocations in a discrete economy wherein individ-
uals di¤er in their productivity.5 Individual types and labor supplies are not publicly
observable, but pre-tax incomes are. This rules out type-specic lump-sum taxes but
allows for nonlinear income taxation. Individual consumption levels of goods, whether
subject to regulation or not, are not observable so that nonlinear taxation and/or pric-
ing of goods are not possible. However, anonymous transactions of goods making linear
commodity taxation feasible. This information structure is by now standard in the tax-
ation literature.6 The key feature of our setup is that some of the goods are produced
by a public/regulated rm subject to a break-even constraint.
While we optimize over all tax instruments including income, we are not concerned
with the properties of the income tax schedule. Our aim is to study the commodity
taxation and pricing rules that emerge for goods that are produced by public/regulated
rms as well as those produced subject to no regulation. We derive these rules for general
preferences but concentrate on to the case of weakly-separable preferences between labor
supply and goods that underlies the AS result. In this way, we demonstrate the rst
major lesson of our study; namely, that the existence of a break-even constraint not only
requires taxation of goods produced by the public/regulated rm but also the taxation
of other goods. In other words, taxation of privately-produced goods are generally
needed to o¤set the distortions created by the public/regulated rms departure from
marginal cost pricing. We then illustrate and elaborate on these lessons by studying a
simple framework with one publicly-provided and two privately-provided goods.
Next, we recast and derive the Ramsey rules for setting wherein taxes (markups)
are used to nance both a revenue requirement and a xed cost (rather than only one of
the two as in the traditional model). While this yields predictable results and is not of
much interest in itself, it is a useful reference point. It also encapsulates and highlight
5Our results will not change if a continuous distribution of types are considered.
6This amounts to adding a nonlinear income tax to the Ramsey tax/pricing problem.
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the e¤ects of the break-even constraint per se. Then, returning to our setting, to gain
a better intuition into the nature of the tax/pricing rules, we consider two special cases
for which the Ramsey model yields simple and well-known results; namely, the cases
of independent Hicksian and Marshallian demand curves. In both the Ramsey solution
implies the so-called inverse elasticity rule.
In the separable Hicksian demand case, we nd that the private goods (not included
in the break-even constraint) continue to go untaxed as in the Atkinson and Stiglitz
setting. On the other hand, the pricing rules used by the public rm are purely e¢ ciency-
driven Ramsey rules. Goods are taxed inversely to their compensated demand elasticity
regardless of their distributional implications. Redistribution is taken care of by the
income tax allowing the public rms prices to be adjusted for revenue raising (as in the
Ramsey model with identical individuals).
Results become less predictable in the case where Marshallian demands are inde-
pendent. Then the e¤ect of the break-even constraint is no longer conned to the goods
subject to this constraint. Instead, it spills over to the other goods who no longer go
untaxed. We continue to get inverse elasticity rules as in the Ramsey model; however,
their structure di¤ers from the traditional expressions one gets in the Ramsey model
without a break-even constraint. On the one hand, they are more complicated than
the pure e¢ ciency rules. On the other hand, there is no covariance (or similar) term
that captures redistributive considerations. Instead, they contain tax revenue terms
that measure the social value of the extra tax revenues generated from demand vari-
ations that follow the (compensating) adjustments in disposable income. These terms
lead to predictions that are similar to those coming from redistributive terms in the
many-household Ramsey model without a break-even constraint; namely, that goods
with higher demand elasticities should be taxed more heavily (see below).
Finally, we study what is arguably the most celebrated general result obtained in
the Ramsey model; namely, the (un)equal proportional reduction in compensated de-
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mands property. We show that, in contrast to the single-household Ramsey model,
the reductions di¤er across goods. This in and of itself is not particularly surprising
given the presence of heterogeneous households. More interestingly, when compared to
the many-household Ramsey case without the break-even constraint, we nd that the
redistributive considerations are once again replaced by tax revenue terms.
2 The model
There are N types of individuals, indexed j = 1; : : : ; N , who di¤er in their wages, wj ,
but have identical preferences. All goods are produced at a constant marginal cost
which we normalize to one. However, some of the goods are produced by a public
or regulated rm which incurs a xed cost. The rm is constrained to break even
by marking up its marginal costs.7 Denote the goods that private sector produces by
x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) and goods that the public rm produce by y = (y1; y2; : : : ; ym). Let
p = (p1; p2; : : : ; pn) denote the consumer price of x and q = (q1; q2; : : : ; qn) the consumer
prices of y: Finally, denote the commodity tax rates on x by t = (t1; t2; : : : ; tn) and the
public rmscommodity-tax-cum-mark-ups by  = (1; 2; : : : ; m):We have pi = 1+ ti
(i = 1; 2; : : : ; n) and qs = 1 +  s (s = 1; 2; : : : ;m).
Individual consumption levels are not publicly observable but anonymous transac-
tions can be observed. Consequently, commodity taxes must be proportional and public
sector prices are linear. For the remaining variables, the information structure is the
one typically considered in mixed taxation models; see e.g., Christiansen (1984) and
Cremer and Gahvari (1997). In particular, an individuals type, wj , and labor input,
Lj , are not publicly observable; his before-tax income, Ij = wjLj , on the other hand,
is. Consequently, type-specic lump-sum taxation is ruled out but non-linear taxation
of incomes is feasible.
7Alternatively one can think of a privately owned regulated rm whose prices are set to cover cost
plus a fair rate of return on capital.
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To characterize the (constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient allocations we derive an optimal
revelation mechanism. For our purpose, a mechanism consists of a set of type-specic
before-tax incomes, Ij s, aggregate expenditures on private goods, cj s, a vector of
consumer prices (same for everyone) for x and for y, p and q. To proceed further, it is
necessary to consider the optimization problem of an individual for a given mechanism
(p; q; c; I). Formally, given any vector (p; q; c; I), an individual of type j maximizes
utility u = u
 
x; y; I=wj

subject to the budget constraint
P
i pixi +
P
s qsys = c.
The resulting demand functions for x and y are denoted by xi = xi
 
p; q; c; I=wj

and ys = ys
 
p; q; c; I=wj

. Substituting in the utility function yields the indirect utility
function
v
 
p; q; c; I=wj
  u x  p; q; c; I=wj ; y  p; q; c; I=wj ; I=wj :
Thus, a j-type individual who is assigned cj ; Ij will have demand functions and an
indirect utility function given by
xji = xi(p; q; c
j ; Ij=wj); (1)
yjs = ys
 
p; q; cj ; Ij=wj

; (2)
vj = v
 
p; q; cj ; Ij=wj

: (3)
Similarly, the demand functions and the indirect utility function for a j-type who claims
to be of type k; the so-called mimicker, is given by
xjki = xi(p; q; c
k; Ik=wj); (4)
yjks = ys

p; q; ck; Ik=wj

; (5)
vjk = v

p; q; ck; Ik=wj

: (6)
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2.1 Pareto-e¢ cient (constrained) allocations
Denote the governments external revenue requirement by R and the xed costs of public
rms by F: Constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations are described, indirectly, as follows.8
Maximize
HX
j=1
jv
 
p; q; cj ; Ij=wj

(7)
with respect to p2; p3; : : : ; pn; q; cj and Ij where js are constants with the normalizationPH
j=1 
j = 1. The maximization is subject to the resource constraint
HX
j=1
j
"
(Ij   cj) +
nX
i=1
(pi   1)xji +
mX
s=1
(qs   1)yjs
#
 R+ F; (8)
the break-even constraint
HX
j=1
j
"
mX
s=1
(qs   1)yjs
#
 F; (9)
and the self-selection constraints
vj  vjk; j; k = 1; 2; : : : ;H: (10)
Denote the Lagrangian expression by L, and the Lagrangian multipliers associated
with the resource constraint (8) by ; the public rmsbreak-even constraint (9) by ,
and with the self-selection constraints (10) by jk. We have9
L =
X
j
jvj + 
8<:X
j
j
"
(Ij   cj) +
nX
i=1
(pi   1)xji +
mX
s=1
(qs   1)yjs
#
  R  F
9=;
+
8<:X
j
j
"
mX
s=1
(qs   1)yjs
#
  F
9=;+X
j
X
k 6=j
jk(vj   vjk): (11)
8 Indirectly because the optimization is over a mix of quantities and prices. Then, given the com-
modity prices, utility maximizing individuals would choose the quantities themselves.
9Recall that p1 = 1 so that
nX
i=1
(pi   1)xji =
nX
i=2
(pi   1)xji
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The rst-order conditions of this problem with respect to Ij ; cj , for j; k = 1; 2; : : : ;H; and
pi; qs; for i = 2; 3; : : : ; n; and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m; characterize the Pareto-e¢ cient allocations
constrained both by the public rmsbreak-even constraint, the resource constraint,
the self-selection constraints, as well as the linearity of commodity tax rates. They are
derived in the Appendix.
One feature of this setup is of note. With x and y being homogeneous of degree
zero in p; q; and c; consumer prices can determined only up to a proportionality factor.
Consequently, we do not optimize over p1 and set its value at p1 = 1. In the absence
of the break-even constraint, this normalization is without any loss of generality. With
a binding break-even constraint, it does involve a restriction, namely that we rule out
an across the board uniform increase in all (consumer) prices to ensure that the public
rms revenues cover xed costs. While this is a theoretical possibility in this setting,
it does not appear to be a realistic course of action. As a matter of fact such a policy
would be in contradiction with the very idea of imposing a break-even constraint in the
rst place.10
3 Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem and optimal commodity
taxes
In the standard mixed taxation model without the break-even constraint, assuming
preferences are weakly separable in goods and labor supply, the Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976) theorem on the redundancy of commodity taxes holds. The particular feature of
separability that drives the AS result is the property that a j-type who pretends to be
10 In a setting where tax policy is restricted by informational considerations only, the break-even
constraint could be undone by a simple lump-sum transfers (from the government to the operator). The
RB approach rules out such a transfer in an ad hoc way. This reects some considerations which are not
explicitly addressed in the models. For instance, for political economy reasons it is required that natural
gas users (and not the taxpayer) are responsible to nance the transportation network of pipeline and
pumping stations.
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of type k will have the same demand as type k: That is,
xjki = x
k
i = xi(p; q; c
k);
yjks = y
k
s = ys

p; q; ck

:
This arises because with separability preferences take the following form u = u
 
f
 
x; y

; I=wj

:
Under this circumstance, the (conditional) demand functions for x and y specied in
equations (1)(2) and (4)(5) will be independent of I=wj so that xi = xi
 
p; q; c

and
ys = ys
 
p; q; c

: Moreover, the indirect utility function too will be weakly separable in 
p; q; c

and I=wj and written as v
 

 
p; q; c

; I=wj

:
The above property also has far reaching implications for optimal commodity taxes;
both those produced by the public rm as well as privately. To derive these, introduce
the compensated version of demand functions (1)(2). Specically, denote the compen-
sated demand for a good by a tilde over the corresponding variable. Let  denote
the (n+m  1) (n+m  1) matrix derived from the Slutsky matrix, aggregated over
all individuals, by deleting its rst row and column,
 =
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
P
j 
j @~x
j
2
@p2
   Pj j @~xj2@pn Pj j @~xj2@q1    Pj j @~xj2@qm
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...P
j 
j @~x
j
n
@p2
   Pj j @~xjn@pn Pj j @~xjn@q1    Pj j @~xjn@qmP
j 
j @~y
j
1
@p2
   Pj j @~yj1@pn Pj j @~yj1@q1    Pj j @~yj1@qm
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...P
j 
j @~y
j
m
@p2
   Pj j @~yjm@pn Pj j @~yjm@q1    Pj j @~yjm@qm
1CCCCCCCCCCCA
: (12)
We prove in the Appendix that in this case optimal commodity taxes satisfy the following
equations, 0BBBBBBBBBB@
t2
...
tn
1 + 

1
...
1 + 

m
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=   

 1
0BBBBBBBB@
0
...
0P
j 
jyj1
...P
j 
jyjm
1CCCCCCCCA
: (13)
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Observe that if F = 0, i.e. if there is no xed cost, the break-even constraint is
irrelevant. Under this circumstance,  = 0 and the right-hand side of (13) consists of a
vector of n 1+m zeros. One then obtains ti = 0 and  s = 0 (marginal cost pricing) for
all i = 1; : : : ; n and s = 1; : : : ;m, and returns to the Atkinson and Stiglitz result that
commodity taxes are redundant. With F > 0, the break-even constraint is necessarily
violated under marginal cost pricing so that  > 0. In this case, the rst (n   1) lines
on the of (13) continue to be zero, but the other lines di¤er from zero. It then follows
that the solution no longer implies all ts and all s are zero. Nor will it be the case
that the ts are necessarily zero.
This latter point, that the existence of a break-even point requires not only the
taxation of goods produced by the public rm but also the taxation of privately-provided
goods, constitutes the rst major lesson of our study. To see the reason for it, we resort
to a simple special case with limited number of goods.
3.1 Two privately-produced goods, one public
Under this simple structure, and with t1 = 0; t2 and 1 are found from equation (13) to
be 
t2
1 + 

1
!
=
 

"P
j 
j @~x
j
2
@p2
P
j 
j @~y
j
1
@q1
 
P
j 
j @~x
j
2
@q1
2#
0@  Pj j @~xj2@q1 Pj jyj1P
j 
j @~x
j
2
@p2
P
j 
jyj1
1A :
It immediately follows from the above that
t2 =
P
j 
j @~x
j
2
@q1
 Pj j @~xj2@p2

1 +



1:
With 1 > 0 to cover the xed costs, and @~x
j
2=@p2 < 0; t2 has the same sign asP
j 
j

@~xj2=@q1

=
P
j 
j

@~yj1=@p2

: Thus if @~yj1=@p2 > 0; one sets t2 > 0: This
increases p2 and, with it, ~y
j
1: On the other hand, if @~y
j
1=@p2 < 0; one sets t2 < 0: This
lowers p2 and, as a result, increases ~y
j
1: Either way then, one sets t2 to increase ~y1:
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The break-even condition increases the price of y1 above its marginal cost so that its
consumption is less than optimal. One attempts to reverse this through t2: As a general
lesson, taxation of privately-produced goods are necessitated to o¤set the distortions
created by having to depart from marginal cost pricing on the part of the public rm.
The second important lesson we are seeking to answer is the extent to which the pric-
ing rules dened by (13) resemble the traditional Ramsey rules. Traditionally, however,
the Ramsey pricing rules are derived for either a unied government budget constraint
(in the public nance literature), or for a public rm (in the regulation literature), but
not for the two together as we have done here. Adding on a break-even constraint to
the governments budget constraint in the Ramsey problem, however, does not change
the structure of Ramsey taxes or Ramsey pricing rules. This is easy to establish. For
completeness, and to establish a benchmark for comparison, we do this in the next
section.
4 Benchmark: the many-consumer Ramsey problem
An individual of type j now maximizes his utility u = u
 
x; y; L

subject to the bud-
get constraint
P
i pixi +
P
s qsys = w
j (1  )L + b; where  is the linear income tax
rate and b is the uniform lump-sum rebate. The resulting demand functions for x
and y; and the supply function for L; are denoted by xji = xi
 
p; q; wj (1  ) ; b ; yjs =
ys
 
p; q; wj (1  ) ; b ; and Lj = L  p; q; wj (1  ) ; b : Substituting in the utility func-
tion yields the indirect utility function
vj = v
 
p; q; wj (1  ) ; b
 u  x  p; q; wj (1  ) ; b ; y  p; q; wj (1  ) ; b ; L  p; q; wj (1  ) ; b :
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Let j denote the proportion of individuals of type j in the economy and consider a
utilitarian social welfare function of the form
HX
j=1
jW
 
vj

;
where W () is increasing, twice di¤erentiable, and concave. The optimization problem
consists of maximizing
P
j 
jW
 
vj

with respect to p; q; b and subject to resource and
break-even constraints (8)(9). Observe that with x and y being homogeneous of degree
zero in p; q; wj (1  ) and b; consumer prices can determined only up to a proportion-
ality factor. It is for this reason that we do not optimize over , setting it equal to
zero.
Dene
j  @v
j
@b
;
j  1

@W
@vj
@vj
@b
;
j  j +
nX
e=1
te
@xje
@b
+

1 +


 mX
f=1
 f
@yjf
@b
;

 
0BBBBBBBBBBB@
P
j 
j @~x
j
1
@p1
   Pj j @~xj1@pn Pj j @~xj1@q1    Pj j @~xj1@qm
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...P
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m
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   Pj j @~yjm@pn Pj j @~yjm@q1    Pj j @~yjm@qm
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:
Manipulating the rst-order conditions of the governments optimization problem, given
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in the Appendix, we prove there,0BBBBBBBBBB@
t1
...
tn
1 + 

1
...
1 + 

m
1CCCCCCCCCCA
= 
 1
0BBBBBBBBBB@
PH
j=1
 
1  jjxj1
...PH
j=1
 
1  jjxjnPH
j=1

1 +    j

jyj1
...PH
j=1

1 +    j

jyjm
1CCCCCCCCCCA
; (14)
where we also prove that
HX
j=1
jj = 1:
Observe that while the structure of taxes on private goods and the goods provided by
the public rm are not identical, the same Ramsey tax/pricing rules apply to both under
this setting. This is the benchmark with which one should compare and evaluate our
result under nonlinear income taxes and weak separability presented in equation (13).11
The most striking di¤erence between the sets of results is the lack of any distrib-
utional considerations in (13) as compared to (14) wherein distribution concerns enter
through j : This constitutes the second important lesson of our study: The tax/pricing
rules for both types of goods, those that are produced privately and those that re provided
through the public rm, are not a¤ected by redistribution concerns.
To gain a better intuition into the nature of the tax/pricing rules, we next consider
the two well-known special cases for which the Ramsey model yields simple results;
namely, the cases of independent Hicksian and Marshallian demand curves. In both of
these cases, the Ramsey solution implies the so called inverse elasticity rules. Following
these cases, we examine the most celebrated general result of the Ramsey model; namely
the (un)equal proportional reduction in compensated demands property.
11The many-consumer Ramsey problem is considered here while allowing for a uniform lump-sum
rebate, b: The literature considers this problem for both cases when b is and is not present. The same
tax/pricing rules are derived in both cases. The only di¤erence is that when b is present, the optimization
over b results in
P
j 
jj = 1: This result does not hold when b is not present.
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5 Pareto e¢ cient versus Ramsey pricing rules
5.1 Zero cross-price compensated elasticities
Assume that Hicksian demands are independent so that the compensated demand of
any produced good does not depend on the prices of the other produced goods. In this
case, the reduced Slutsky matrix (where the line and column pertaining to leisure is
deleted) is diagonal so that equation (13) simplies to
0BBBBBBBBBB@
t2
...
tn
1 + 

1
...
1 + 

m
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=


0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0
...
0P
j 
jyj1
 Pj j @~yj1@q1
...P
j 
jyjm
 Pj j @~yjm@qm
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
Consequently, for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
ti = 0;
 s =

+ 
P
j 
jyjs
 Pj j @~yjs@qs =

+ 
qs
P
j 
jyjsP
j 
j ~yjse"jss ;
where e"jss is the absolute value of the j-types own-price elasticity of compensated de-
mand for ys: Or, for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m; ti = 0 and
 s
1 +  s
=

P
j 
jyjs
(+ )
P
j 
jyjse"jss ; (15)
which is an inverse elasticity rule.
The above result is to be compared with the case of independent Hicksian demands
under linear income taxes. There, the corresponding results are, for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
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and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;12
ti
1 + ti
=
P
j
 
1  jjxjiP
j 
jxjiejii =
 Cov

xji ; 
j

P
j 
jxjiejii ; (16)
 s
1 +  s
=
P
j
 
1 + =  jjyjs
(1 + =)
P
j 
jyjse"jss =

P
j 
jyjs   Cov

yjs; j

(+ )
P
j 
jyjse"jss ; (17)
where ejii is the absolute value of the j-types own-price elasticity of compensated de-
mands for xi and Cov(:; :) denotes covariance. Observe that in this traditional model,
both types of goods, are subject to the inverse elasticity rules adjusted for redistrib-
ution benets (through the covariance terms). However, with nonlinear income taxes
and weak-separability, all covariance term disappear. This implies that there will be no
tax on private goods while the goods provided by the public form are subject to the
inverse elasticity rule that reect pure e¢ ciency considerations; see equation (15).
To sum, we nd that in this special case, the private goods (not included in the
break-even constraint) continue to go untaxed as in the AS setting. On the other hand,
the pricing rules used by the public rm are purely e¢ ciency-driven Ramsey rules.
Goods are taxed inversely to their compensated demand elasticity regardless of their
distributional implications. Redistribution is taken care of by the income tax allowing
the public rms prices to be adjusted for revenue raising (as in the Ramsey model with
identical individuals).
It will become clear below that the apparent simplicity of this rule is to some extent
misleading. It obscures some e¤ects which are present but happen to cancel out in this
special case. We shall return to this issue in the next subsections.
12These derivations are found by setting the cross-price derivatives in equations (A21)(A22) equal
to zero and rearranging the terms. The covariance interpretation follows because of the result thatP
j 
j = 1:
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5.2 Zero cross-price elasticities
We now turn to the case where Marshallian demand functions are independent so that
the demand for any given good does not depend on the prices of other (produced)
goods.13 To simplify the pricing rules that obtain in this case, it is simpler to start
from the intermediate expressions (A10)(A11) given in the Appendix rather than from
(13). Rearranging these expressions, making use of the weak-separability assumption,
and setting all the cross-price derivatives equal to zero, we obtain for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n
and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
ti
X
j
j
@xji
@pi
+
X
j
jxji
24 nX
e=1
te
@xje
@cj
+

1 +


 mX
f=1
 f
@yjf
@cj
35 = 0; (18)

1 +



 s
X
j
j
@yjs
@qs
+
X
j
jyjs
24 nX
e=1
te
@xje
@cj
+

1 +


 mX
f=1
 f
@yjf
@cj
35+ 

X
j
jyjs = 0:
(19)
Before simplifying these expressions any further, it is informative to delve into their
interpretation. Recall that we are considering a compensated variation in the tax rates
such that dcj = x
j
idti for a variation in ti and dcj = y
j
sdqs for a variation in  s. In other
words, individual disposable incomes are adjusted to keep utility levels constant for all
individuals. With utility levels unchanged, the impact of the variation on social welfare
entirely depends on the extra tax revenue (or prot) it generates. The left-hand sides
of (18)(19) measure the social value of this extra tax revenue (for a variation in ti or
in  s respectively). Obviously, when the tax system is optimized, this social value must
be equal to zero (otherwise welfare could be increased by changing the tax rates).
To understand this interpretation, assume one changes cj after ti or  s changes.
13Much of the regulation and IO literature uses quasi linear preference. In that case there are no
income e¤ects and the distinction between Hicksian and Marshallian demand becomes irrelevant.
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Start with a variation in ti. With the tax revenues being given by
X
j
j
0@ nX
e=1
tex
j
e +
mX
f=1
 fy
j
f
1A ;
and the cross-price derivatives being equal to zero, the change in ti produces an extra
tax revenue of X
j
jxji + ti
X
j
j
@xji
@pi
:
Our compensation rule requires
P
j 
jxji of this to be rebated to individuals.
14 The net
change in revenue, minus compensation, is equal to
ti
X
j
j
@xji
@pi
:
This is the rst expression on the left-hand side of (18). At the same time, the
P
j 
jxji
compensation leads to an additional tax revenue of
nX
e=1
tex
j
e
0@X
j
jxji
1A+ mX
f=1
 fy
j
f
0@X
j
jxji
1A =
0@X
j
jxji
1A0@ nX
e=1
tex
j
e +
mX
f=1
 fy
j
f
1A :
To convert these tax revenue changes into social welfare (measured in units of general
revenues), one must multiply tax revenue variations emanating from y-goods by a factor
of (1 + =): This is because the revenue from y-goods enters both the global govern-
ment budget constraint as well as the break-even constraint. This results in the second
expression on the left-hand side of (18).
The left-hand side of (19) can be decomposed in a similar way, except for one extra
complication; namely the additional term (=)
P
j 
jyjs. In this exercise,
P
j 
jyjs rep-
resents the value of the refunds to individuals. When collected as a tax, this amount has
a social value of (1+=)
P
j 
jyjs. On the other hand, the refund costsonly
P
j 
jyjs
(it comes from the general budget and has no impact on the break even constraint).
14To see this, observe that cj changes according to dcj = x
j
idti so that aggregate compensations
change by
P
j 
jdcj =
P
j 
jxji

dti:
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Finally, to ease the comparison with traditional Ramsey expressions, we can rewrite
(18)(19) as inverse elasticity rules. Introducing
Ai =
HX
j=1
jxji
24 nX
e=1
te
@xje
@cj
+

1 +


 mX
f=1
 f
@yjf
@cj
35 ;
Bs =
HX
j=1
jyjs
24 nX
e=1
te
@xje
@cj
+

1 +


 mX
f=1
 f
@yjf
@cj
35+ 

X
j
jyjs;
where Ai and Bs measure the social value of the extra tax revenues due to refunds, with
Bs also including (=)
P
j 
jyjs: We have, for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
ti
1 + ti
=
AiP
j 
jxji
j
ii
; (20)
 s
1 +  s
=
Bs
(1 + =)
P
j 
jyjs"
j
ss
; (21)
where and jii and "
j
ss denote the absolute value of the j-types own-price elasticity of
Marshallian demands for xi and ys:
Expressions (20)(21) have a number of interesting implications, particularly when
compared to their traditional counterparts. First, the e¤ect of the break-even constraint
is no longer conned to the goods which enter this constraint. Instead, it spills over to the
other goods which no longer go untaxed; compare with the result obtained in Subsection
5.1. Second, we get inverse elasticity rules as in the Ramsey model; albeit without
redistributive terms. This becomes clear below. The numerator of both expressions
contain the tax revenueterms Ai and Bs. Recall that these expressions measure the
social value of the extra tax revenue generated from the demand variations that follow
the (compensating) adjustments in disposable income.
One may wonder why these terms where absent in Subsection 5.1. The key to
understanding this property is that when Hicksian demands are independent, the price-
cum-income variations we consider have by denition no impact on the demand of any of
the other goods. And the e¤ect on the good under consideration is already captures in
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the (compensated) elasticity term. To sum up, Subsection 5.1 has given simple results,
not because the di¤erent e¤ects were absent but because they happen to cancel out
exactly under the considered assumptions.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the counterparts of (20)(21) in the traditional
Ramsey model, under linear income taxes and independent Marshallian demands, are
for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
ti
1 + ti
=
Ai   Cov

xji ; 
j

P
j 
jxji
j
ii
; (22)
 s
1 +  s
=
Bs   Cov

yjs; j

(1 + =)
P
j 
jyjs"
j
ss
: (23)
These relationships are derived in the Appendix. Comparison of these relationships
with (20)(21) reveal that in our setup we have the exact expressions for optimal tax
rates except for the covariance terms which vanish.
5.3 Proportional reduction in compensated demands
When there are cross-price e¤ects, the Ramsey model no longer gives results that can be
presented as simplyas the inverse elasticity rules. One of the popular way to present
the tax rules is in terms of proportional reduction in compensated demands. This leads
to the celebrated equal proportional reductionresults in the pure e¢ ciency case, while
the reduction depends on redistributive considerations in the many household case.
With separable preferences, one can rearrange equations (A12)(A13) in the Appen-
dix as follows
 
nX
e=1
te
0@X
j
j
@~xji
@pe
1A   mX
f=1
 f
0@X
j
j
@~xji
@qf
1A =  mX
f=1
 f
0@X
j
j
@eyjf
@pi
1A ;
 
nX
e=1
te
0@X
j
j
@~yjs
@pe
1A   mX
f=1
 f
0@X
j
j
@~yjs
@qf
1A =  mX
f=1
 f
0@X
j
j
@~yjf
@qs
1A+ X
j
jyjs:
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which can be written as
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P
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j
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
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 f
P
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j @~x
j
i
@qf

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
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; (24)
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P
j 
j @~y
j
f
@qs

P
j 
jyjs
:
(25)
The left-hand side of (24) and (25) represents the proportional reduction in compensated
demand of xi and yi respectively. Unlike in the single household Ramsey case it di¤ers
across goods. As a matter of fact, it is proportional to the compensated impact of the
considereds goods tax rate on the break even constraint. Consequently we nd that
like in Subsection 5.2 redistributive considerations are replaced by tax revenue or more
precisely revenue of the regulated rm.
These are to be compared with, for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;15
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e=1 te
P
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j @exji
@pe
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 f
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
xji ; 
j

P
j 
jxji
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e=1 te
P
j 
j @eyjs
@pe

+
Pm
f=1  f
P
j 
j @eyjs
@qf

P
j 
jyjs
=


+


Pm
f=1  f
P
j 
j @~y
j
f
@qs

  Cov

yjs; j

P
j 
jyjs
:
One gain immediately observes that the two sets of formulas are identical except for the
covariance terms which have nished in equations (24) and (25).
15This follows by rearranging equations (A21)(A22) in the Appendix, where we have substituted
 Cov  xji ; j for Pj  1  jjxji and  Cov  yjs; j for Pj  1  jjyjs:
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6 Conclusion
This paper has examined if the optimal tax and regulatory pricing approaches to Ram-
sey pricing can be reconciled. We have incorporate the two objectives of revenue raising
for nancing the governments expenditures (including redistributive transfers) and a
regulated rms xed cost into a single framework. Except for the rms break even
constraint (which has no obvious informational justication) tax instruments were re-
stricted only by informational considerations. Our setting is that of Atkinson and
Stiglitz. More precisely, we have considered a mixed taxation setting à la Christiansen
(1984) that combines nonlinear income taxation with linear pricing (taxation) of con-
sumption goods.
The rst major lesson that has emerged from our study is that the existence of
a break-even constraint not only requires taxation of goods produced by the pub-
lic/regulated rm but also the taxation of other goods. In other words, the break-
even constraints spills over to the other (non regulated) goods and a¤ects their tax
treatment.
To obtain more specic conclusions, we have considered two special cases for which
the Ramsey model yields simple and well-known results; namely, the cases of indepen-
dent Hicksian and Marshallian demand curves. In both the Ramsey solution implies
the so-called inverse elasticity rule.
In the separable Hicksian demand case, the private goods (not included in the break-
even constraint) continue to go untaxed as in the Atkinson and Stiglitz setting. In the
case where Marshallian demands are independent, the e¤ect of the break-even constraint
spills over to the other goods who no longer go untaxed. We continue to get inverse
elasticity rules; however, their structure di¤ers from the traditional expressions. In
particular, there is no covariance (or similar) term that captures redistributive consid-
erations. Instead, they contain tax revenue termsthat measure the social value of the
extra tax revenues generated from demand variations that follow the (compensating)
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adjustments in disposable income.
Finally, we revisit the most celebrated general result obtained in the Ramsey model;
namely, the (un)equal proportional reduction in compensated demands property. We
nd that the redistributive considerations are once again replaced by tax revenue terms.
Our analysis could lead to a number of interesting extensions. First, it would be
interesting to assess how signicant the spill over e¤ects on nonregulated goods are
compared to the markups imposed on the goods included in the break-even constraint.
Our various expressions suggest that this depends mainly on the signicance of the
(compensated) cross-price e¤ects. However, the way in which they operate appears
to be complex and not much can be said at this level of generality. While numerical
examples could provide some illustrative indications a more satisfactory answer can only
be provided by an empirical study. Second, our formulation relies on a traditional type
of regulation which, while still applied in some sectors, has been given up or amended
in many others. Consequently it would be interesting to extend our study to account
for alternative regulatory arrangements, together with the introduction of competition
and the use of more sophisticated pricing schemes in the relevant sectors. Last but not
least, regulation very often pursues specic (often non welfarist) redistributive objective
(like universal access) and it would be interesting to study how they interact with the
general tax policy.
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Appendix A
First-order characterization of the(constrained) Pareto-e¢ cient allocations:
Rearranging the terms in (11), and dropping the constants R and F; one may usefully
rewrite the Lagrangian expression as
L =
X
j
0@j +X
k 6=j
jk
1A vj + X
j
j
"
(Ij   cj) +
nX
i=1
(pi   1)xji
#
+(+ )
X
j
j
"
mX
s=1
(qs   1)yjs
#
 
X
j
X
k 6=j
jkvjk: (A1)
The rst-order conditions of this problem are, for j; k = 1; 2; : : : ;H;
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X
j
0@j +X
k 6=j
jk
1A vjs + X
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nX
e=1
(pe   1)@x
j
e
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X
j
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f=1
(qf   1)
@yjf
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35 X
j
X
k 6=j
jkvjks = 0; s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
(A5)
where the tax on xj1 is xed at zero and a subscript on v
j denotes a partial derivative.
Equations (A2)(A5) characterize the Pareto-e¢ cient allocations constrained both by
the public rmsbreak-even constraint, the resource constraint, the self-selection con-
straints, as well as the linearity of commodity tax rates.
Optimal commodity taxes: Multiply equation (A3) by xji , sum over j and add the
resulting equation to (A4). Similarly, multiply (A3) by yjs, sum over j and add the
resulting equation to (A5). Simplifying results in the following system of equations for
i = 2; 3; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
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
+ 
X
j
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(A7)
With vji + x
j
iv
j
c = 0 from Roys identity, the left-hand side of (A6) shows the impact
on the Lagrangian expression L of a variation in pi when the disposable income of
individuals is adjusted according to
dcj = x
j
idti; (A8)
to keep their utility levels constant. With vjs + y
j
sv
j
c = 0, the left-hand side of (A7)
shows the same compensated e¤ect for a variation in qs where
dcj = y
j
sd s: (A9)
These compensated derivatives, (@L=@pi)vj=vj and (@L=@qs)vj=vj vanish at the optimal
solution.
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Make use of Roys identity to set,
vji + x
j
iv
j
c = 0;
vkji + x
kj
i v
kj
c = 0;
vjs + y
j
sv
j
c = 0;
vkjs + y
kj
s v
kj
c = 0:
Substitute these values in equations (A6)(A7), set pi 1 = ti and qs 1 =  s, and divide
by : Upon changing the order of summation and further simplication one arrives at,
for all i = 2; 3; : : : ; n; and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
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Next, using the Slutsky equations,
@xje
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;
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;
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=
@~xje
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;
@yjf
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=
@~yjf
@qs
  yjs
@yjf
@cj
;
while making use of the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, one can further simplify
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(A10)(A11) to
nX
e=1
te
0@X
j
j
@~xji
@pe
1A+ 1 + 

 mX
f=1
 f
0@X
j
j
@~xji
@qf
1A = 1

X
j
X
k 6=j
kj

xji   xkji

vkjc ;
(A12)
nX
e=1
te
0@X
j
j
@~yjs
@pe
1A+ 1 + 

 mX
f=1
 f
0@X
j
j
@~yjs
@qf
1A = 1

X
j
X
k 6=j
kj

yjs   ykjs

vkjc  


X
j
jyjs;
(A13)
which hold for all i = 2; 3; : : : ; n; and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m: Finally, use the denition of  in
(12) to write out equations (A12)(A13) in matrix notation

0BBBBBBBBBB@
t2
...
tn
1 + 

1
...
1 + 

m
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=
1

0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
P
j
P
k 6=j 
kj

xj2   xkj2

vkjc
...P
j
P
k 6=j 
kj

xjn   xkjn

vkjcP
j
P
k 6=j 
kj

yj1   ykj1

vkjc
...P
j
P
k 6=j 
kj

yjm   ykjm

vkjc
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
  

0BBBBBBBB@
0
...
0P
j 
jyj1
...P
j 
jyjm
1CCCCCCCCA
;
(A14)
Collecting the terms involving = and premultiplying through by  1 yields:0BBBBBBBBBB@
t2
...
tn
1 + 

1
...
1 + 

m
1CCCCCCCCCCA
=
1

 1
0BBBBBBBBBBBB@
P
j
P
k 6=j 
kj

xj2   xkj2

vkjc
...P
j
P
k 6=j 
kj

xjn   xkjn

vkjcP
j
P
k 6=j 
kj

yj1   ykj1

vkjc
...P
j
P
k 6=j 
kj

yjm   ykjm

vkjc
1CCCCCCCCCCCCA
  

 1
0BBBBBBBB@
0
...
0P
j 
jyj1
...P
j 
jyjm
1CCCCCCCCA
:
(A15)
Now, as shown in the text, weak-separability of preferences in labor supply and
goods implies that xjki = x
k
i and y
jk
s = yks for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m:
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This property reduces that the rst matrix on the right-hand side of (A15) to zero so
that (A15) simplies to (13) as given in the text.
Derivation of (14), the Ramsey tax rule: The Lagrangian expression associated
with maximizing
P
j 
jW
 
vj

with respect to p; q; b and subject to constraints (8)(9)
is represented by
L =
X
j
jW
 
vj

+ 
8<:X
j
j
"
nX
i=1
(pi   1)xji +
mX
s=1
(qs   1)yjs   b
#
  R  F
9=;
+
8<:X
j
j
"
mX
s=1
(qs   1)yjs
#
  F
9=; :
The rst-order conditions of this problem are,
@L
@b
=
X
j
j
@W
@vj
@vj
@b
+ 
X
j
j
"
 1 +
nX
i=1
(pi   1)@x
j
i
@b
#
+
(+ )
X
j
j
"
mX
s=1
(qs   1)@y
j
s
@b
#
= 0; (A16)
@L
@pi
=
X
j
j
@W
@vj
@vj
@pi
+ 
X
j
j
"
xji +
nX
e=1
(pe   1)@x
j
e
@pi
#
+
(+ )
X
j
j
24 mX
f=1
(qf   1)
@yjf
@pi
35 = 0; i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; (A17)
@L
@qs
=
X
j
j
@W
@vj
@vj
@qs
+ 
X
j
j
"
nX
e=1
(pe   1)@x
j
e
@qs
#
+
(+ )
X
j
j
24yjs + mX
f=1
(qf   1)
@yjf
@qs
35 = 0; s = 1; 2; : : : ;m: (A18)
Using the denitions of j ; j ; and j in the text, the rst-order condition with respect
to b; equation (A16), is simplied to
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X
j
jj = 1:
Next, using Roys identity, the rst-order conditions (A17)(A18) are simplied to, for
all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n; and s = 1; 2; : : : ;m;
X
j
j
24 jxji +
 
xji +
nX
e=1
te
@xje
@pi
!
+

1 +


 mX
f=1
 f
@yjf
@pi
35 = 0; (A19)
X
j
j
24 jyjs +
 
nX
e=1
te
@xje
@qs
!
+

1 +


0@yjs + mX
f=1
 f
@yjf
@qs
1A35 = 0: (A20)
Using the Slutsky equation and the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, equations (A19)
(A20) can also be written as
 
24 nX
e=1
te
0@X
j
j
@exji
@pe
1A+ 1 + 

 mX
f=1
 f
0@X
j
j
@exji
@qf
1A35 =X
j
jxji  
X
j
jjxji ;
(A21)
 
24 nX
e=1
te
0@X
j
j
@eyjs
@pe
1A+ 1 + 

 mX
f=1
 f
0@X
j
j
@eyjs
@qf
1A35 = 1 + 

X
j
jyjs  
X
j
jjyjs:
(A22)
Finally, rewriting equations (A21)(A22) in matrix notation, introducing and pre-multiplying
by 
 1 yields equation (14).
Derivation of (22)(23): Set the cross-price derivatives in equations (A19)(A20)
equal to zero and rearrange the terms to get
ti
1 + ti
=
P
j
 
1  jjxjiP
j 
jxji
j
ii
;
 s
1 +  s
=
P
j
 
1 + =  jjyjs
(1 + =)
P
j 
jyjs"
j
ss
:
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Add and subtract j to j to rewrite the above expressions as
ti
1 + ti
=
P
j
 
j   jjxji  Pj  j   1jxjiP
j 
jxji
j
ii
;
 s
1 +  s
=
P
j
 
j   jjyjs + (=)Pj jyjs  Pj  j   1jyjs
(1 + =)
P
j 
jyjs"
j
ss
:
Rewrite
P
j
 
j   1jxji andPj  j   1jyjs as covariances. Then recall from the de-
nition of j ; that we have j j =Pne=1 te @xje=@b+(1 + =)Pmf=1  f @yjf=@b :
Substitute in above and make use of denition Ai and Bs:
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